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Pakistani politics are characterised by strong corporate social links through kinship and 
caste that impose reciprocal obligations and rights. Marital maps enable allow for accu-
rate prediction of allegiances and decision making and contribute to a transparent assess-
ment of political processes in the country. While much of the focus on reciprocal relations 
has understandably been on descent relations (dynasties), the complex network of marital 
alliances that cut across lineage and sectarian divides helps explain notable levels of sta-
bility despite the fragility of the state and other public institutions. Using the example of 
one of the most successful political dynasties in post independence Pakistan, we show the 
extent of cross lineage, region and even party alliances that shape this political kinship 
network. 
Key Words: Politics, marriage, Pakistan 
Introduction 
Pakistan has borne the brunt of an increasingly hostile international media and political 
rhetoric from prominent politicians around the world that paint Pakistan as a duplicitous, 
unstable country teetering on the brink of collapse. Pakistan has supposedly been teetering 
on the brink of collapse for many decades, however, and the doom and gloom is beginning 
to look a little repetitive. The country has seen repeated military regimes, but they have thus 
far not managed the entrenched hold over the state characteristic of places like Qaddafi's 
Libya or Saddam's Iraq. Zia ul Haq, perhaps the most notorious and brutal of these military 
rulers, tried to cling to power beyond his welcome period and was blown up for his tenacity. 
The excesses of the political elites are beyond question, though, as are the gross inequalities 
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in the distribution of resources within the country. In many respects, Pakistan should be a 
failed state, but evidently it is not. There is a remarkable level of continuity and stability in 
the country despite all of the media reporting that reminds us that there are suicide bombers, 
violent gunmen, intolerant and violent crowds in Pakistan. The civil service, for all of the 
accusations of corruption and incompetence (much of which is undoubtedly true), persists in 
carrying out the bureaucratic functions one associates with the civil service. Pakistan has 
managed to retain a civilian, elected government since the 9th of September 2008, despite 
extremely serious allegations leveled at several high ranking office holders. Despite evi-
dence that the party in power (whichever party that may be) is prone to abusing its power to 
quash dissent, the opposition parties seem capable of holding in check many of the extreme 
measures that get proposed. In this article we examine some of  the reasons for this continu-
ity and stability. Our goal is to understand Pakistan's capacity to maintain state institutions 
successfully in the face of the adversity and violence that have led to the catastrophic col-
lapse of regimes in other parts of the world. 
Nonetheless, there are, indeed, parts of Pakistan's state that appear to have failed. 
Some peripheral regions have never really been under the control of either national or pro-
vincial state institutions, but have been regulated according to local social institutions, which 
reportedly are now dysfunctional. While these regions fall outside the scope of this article, 
we believe that part of the explanation for their relative lack of coherence and stability may 
come from the reverse of the phenomena with which we are concerned—the role of mar-
riage networks in forming powerful political families.  In their case, the dysfunction stems 
from the lack of marriage networks binding key political players together across regions. 
Robustness and Resilience 
Cultural and political systems that survive over time demonstrate certain characteristics that 
allow them to remain recognizably the same while also ensuring sufficient flexibility to 
adapt to external shocks. The dynastic politics of South Asia are well known for producing 
political groups linked by descent, which effectively allow a small set of families to repro-
duce their political positions. These dynasties provide considerable robustness to the system, 
thus ensuring that, whether we look at the political landscape in 1975 or 2015, we see simi-
lar patterns and shapes in the form of the sons, and occasionally daughters, in positions of 
power and authority. The problem with systems when they are overly robust, though, is that 
they can be brittle in the event of severe shocks to the system-- something reasonably fre-
quent in Pakistani politics.  
Read (2005) used data from Netsilik Inuit social organization from the 1920s to il-
lustrate the importance of both resilience and robustness in any sustainable system. Begin-
ning with a serious dilemma of food shortages in harsh winter environments, Read argues 
that Netsilik social relations maximized the reproducibility of the group while ensuring suf-
ficient resilience to adapt to difficult times. In order to maximize the members of a group 
who hunted and fished (men) in relation to those who ate (women+men), the Netsilik devel-
oped cultural notions of personhood that permitted female infanticide prior to the naming of 
a newborn. This resulted in a marked sex imbalance that potentially rendered marriages 
more problematic because of each family's desire to retain the food producer (the man) in a 
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context where there were significantly fewer women than men. The solution to the problem 
of an imbalance in the sex ratio was to practice close cousin marriage, so that the new couple 
remained close enough to their parental households to continue to contribute to them. In 
turn, this triggered problems for winter hunting, which required the cooperation of a large 
number of hunters. The potential fragmentation generated by close cousin marriage and resi-
dential groupings was addressed through an additional, extra-kin social group called Seal 
Partnerships. Seal Partnerships were created at the birth of a boy and defined the exchange 
relationships of seal meat for life. The partnerships ensured that during the lean months of 
winter, when a particular household may face extended periods of unsuccessful hunting 
trips, they would nevertheless be given some seal meat to survive. Thus the social organiza-
tion of the Netsilik Inuit exhibited robust forms of kinship through close cousin marriage, 
which reproduced recognizable related households over time, but also created durable, yet 
flexible and resilient bonds between these close kinship units that maximized survivability in 
times of scarcity. 
Pakistani kinship, existing as it does in economically and politically diverse and con-
tested contexts, unsurprisingly exhibits, like the Netsilik case, both robustness and resilience, 
but within the kinship system in their case. Strongly patrilineal rules of descent and trans-
mission of nasl (roughly translated as the character or type of a person) result in strikingly 
successful political dynasties. Most of today’s prominent leaders come from politically suc-
cessful families of the past. This fits with other models of authority and power transmission 
in South Asia. The network of sufi shrines demonstrate classic assumptions of charismatic 
transference from father to son and from master to pupil. The khilafat, or franchise system of 
the Chishti order of Sufism, for example, is based on both patrilineal descent (from the fam-
ily of the Prophet), as well as instruction from a recognized Chishti master. Overreliance on 
descent, however, introduces potential vulnerabilities in the event of serious shifts in politi-
cal power. Marital alliances are a way to link households in a manner similar to the links 
provided by descent relations. Thus, marital alliances incur mutual expectations of support 
and resource exchange. They also, to some extent, implicate households in one another's 
public reputations. So while the most important people affecting a household's honour, or 
izzat, remain those linked by common descent, everyone connected to the household can 
impact the izzat in some way. Thus, marriages outside unilineal descent groups not only ex-
tend political networks, they also increase the number of households who have a shared in-
terest in maintaining the positive public reputations of all linked households. 
Systems like this vary in their level of complexity. Marriage constitutes one of the 
more interesting and fundamental cultural systems in Pakistan. Marriage follows identifiable 
patterns that legitimize and reproduce certain kinds of social relations. These social relations 
merge domestic and public spheres in ways that demonstrate both resilience (capacity to re-
spond effectively to shock) as well as robustness (capacity to reliably reproduce the system 
across generations). 
Marriage in Pakistan 
Marriage practices in Pakistan are not uniform. There is a great deal of diversity in the 
strategies employed across different families and over time for arranging marriages. 
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Arranged marriages are frequent and there appears to be cultural consensus on the criteria 
used for selecting marriage partners. Though not an elementary kinship system in Lévi-
Strauss’s (1969)  terms, there are clearly many more positive guidelines about who young 
people should marry than one would find in a complex system largely defined, according to 
Lévi-Strauss, by whom one should not marry. Donnan (2010:23–34) and Fischer (1994) de-
scribe marriage strategies that explicitly cite a preference for marriages based on similarities. 
Marriage partners should be very similar to each other, should come from the same zat or 
caste, have similar education levels, and their families should have relatively similar income 
levels.  They should have grown up eating the same types of food and listening to the same 
children’s stories and songs. They should share the same religious outlook on life, and so on. 
This, people will say, leads to more stable and happier marriages, not only for the couples, 
but for the extended family members who must accept the new spouse into their homes.  
One widespread strategy for ensuring that like marries with like is to arrange mar-
riages between cousins, though they need not be within the same patrilineage (biradari). If a 
single cousin connection is good, then a double cousin connection is even better. Lyon’s host 
in a village in northern Punjab boasted of having a double first cousin connection to his wife 
(Lyon 2004). Lyon (2013) discusses the importance of cousin marriages as an inheritance 
strategy. He argues that such strategies are neither monolithic nor exclusive. He analyzed 
marriages from a 200 year time period in a single village in northern Punjab and concluded 
that a single landowning family  had a split marriage strategy. One part of the family tended 1
to marry unrelated village outsiders, while another part appeared to prefer arranged mar-
riages to close cousins within the village. These two strategies continued for more than 100 
years, but then changed around the time of Pakistan’s independence from Britain and separa-
tion from India. These two strategies provided increase resilience in the face of political and 
economic uncertainty, but when the political landscape became more predictable, the strate-
gies converged into a more cooperative and mutually beneficial pattern of intermarriage be-
tween previously distinct lineages. 
Elite Families 
In 1968, Dr Mahbub ul Haq, the then Chief Economist of the Planning Commission of Pa-
kistan, identified 22 Pakistani families in Pakistan who controlled 66% of the industrial as-
sets and 87% of the banking (Bari 2011). These families, he argued, had become both the 
Planning Commission and the Finance Ministry for the private sector (Haq 1973). In 1974, 
White (1974) expanded this number to 42 families. In a special pre-election issue of the Pak-
istani magazine, The Herald, Zahid (2013) states that the number of Pakistani dynastic fami-
lies dominating electoral politics is 597.  Although the exact number of families seems to 2
vary a bit, there does appear to be a small number of families who disproportionately control 
the bulk of the country’s industrial and financial assets. Many of these families are also 
powerful landowners, so their influence is not restricted to just industry and banking. Though 
these families include many prominent names that appear in the rolls of the Senate, the Na-
tional Assembly, government ministries and so on, they are singled out largely for their ap-
parent lack of accountability. Their sin, according to these authors, is not that they have mo-
nopolized elected offices, but rather that they hold most of the country’s assets. 
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For the most part, the emphasis, both in Pakistan and in political science analyses, 
has been on the political and economic implications of  familial connections through descent 
or siblinghood. The Sharif brothers (Nawaz and Shahbaz) have been tremendously influen-
tial, both economically and politically, with children who are also active in electoral politics 
in Pakistan. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the son of the Asif Ali Zardari and the late Benazir 
Bhutto, the daughter of one of Pakistan's most famous politicians, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, is 
driven by an interest in familial political inheritance rather than simply the accumulation of 
wealth. The desire to create political dynasties is not unique to Pakistan, or indeed South 
Asia. Duindam’s (2016) examination of historical dynasties around the word suggests that 
while transmission of political power within families may be discouraged in contemporary 
Western Europe and North America, such practices are not entirely alien to any part of the 
world. While the lineage based transmission of political authority and power in Pakistani 
politics is unquestionably interesting and worth exploring further, the indirect alliances cre-
ated through marriage are equally important. The factional divisions and rivalries are well-
accounted for in a descent-centric model, but this model deals poorly with broader instances 
of cooperation that underpin initiatives in which there are relatively peaceful transitions be-
tween radically opposed regimes. Though descent and lineage connections among party 
politicians are of interest, we focus here, instead, on marital connections between individuals 
in order to determine the degree to which these connections cross party lines. 
The Marital Networks 
Some political families maintain marriages almost exclusively with members of their own 
biradari (lineage) and within their own political party. Even in these cases, however, there 
are always potential connections that could be formed outside the biradari and the party in 
the form of marriages with currently serving or recently retired military personnel. The 
armed forces in Pakistan, although ostensibly apolitical, must be seen as a powerful political 
organization. This is explicit during the times of military rule, but remains true during times 
of elected civilian governments as well. Some families are more avid instigators than others 
of cross region and caste marriages that help to create and consolidate province-wide politi-
cal networks. One of the most famous of these families is the Chaudhrys of Gujrat, but they 
are far from unique in adopting this culturally meaningful tactic.  
The reason we have chosen the Chaudhrys of Gujrat to illustrate the argument is 
largely a matter of practicalities. They are one of the most successful political families in 
Punjab, so much of their genealogical and marital data are available in public records. The 
data used for this paper, for example, have all been derived from newspaper accounts of 
marriages and obituaries, in which people's fathers-in-law are frequently reported. We have 
examined other political families' marital records, but these data are more confidential and 
therefore from more problematic sources. We have the utmost respect for this family and do 
not present their marriage decisions as either deviant or corrupt in any way. 
The Chaudhrys of Gujrat 
Gujrat district lies between Lahore and Rawalpindi. Historically, it was not a major center of 
national or provincial power prior to the creation of Pakistan. Like many districts in Pa-
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kistan, it has been landlord dominated and elections have been marked by a sharp emphasis 
on biradari networks and broader patron client networks. This district is distinguishable by a 
particularly astute family of Jats, who have not only demonstrated considerable political 
acumen, but have proven, beyond any doubt, that marital alliances can help in the creation 
of cross regional and cross quom or caste political blocs. In the 1950s and 1960s, Chaudhry 
Zahoor Elahi, a former government official who had become a businessman, contested local 
elections and became a significant political force. Like a great many civilian politicians in 
Pakistan, he proved his credentials as an opposition politician under the military regime of 
Ayub Khan (1958-1968), in part through imprisonment. He was a minister in the caretaker 
government between the end of Yaya Khan's military government (1968-1970) and the be-
ginning of Z. A. Bhutto's government (1971-1977). He continued his role as a prominent 
opposition politician during Bhutto's governance. He may possibly have gone on to play a 
prominent role under Zia ul Haq's military rule (1977-1988), but was assassinated in 1981. 
His brother, Chaudhry Manzoor Elahi, was successful in provincial electoral politics and 
served as a Member of the Punjab Provincial Assembly. His sons, the eldest of whom is 
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, and his nephew, Chaudhry Parvez Elahi, have taken up the ba-
ton from their fathers and have played a prominent role in Pakistani politics since the mid 
1980s. Ch. Shujaat Hussain is now a former Prime Minister of Pakistan and currently a Sen-
ator. Ch. Parvez Elahi is leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q). The family's political 
success has risen and dipped over the years, but there can be no doubt that they remain one 
of the most influential political families in the country. 
The dynastic network of the Chaudhrys of Gujrat tells only part of the story, howev-
er. If they were truly reliant on just the obvious patrilineal descent ties, they would not be 
part of the evident province-wide political base. Similarly, if they relied primarily on bi-
radari politics, then they would soon find themselves losing out against the larger biradari 
across other parts of Punjab and Pakistan (notably the Gujars, who may number as many as 
30 million across Pakistan). The key to understanding the tremendous influence that this 
family has had lies, instead, in a careful examination of their marital alliances. 
One of Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi's daughters is married to Major Tahir Saddiq, who 
comes from a successful political family from Attock District in northern Punjab (see Figure 
1). Maj. Tahir Saddiq's father, Sardar Sadiq Khan, and mother, Begum Sadiq, were both 
elected politicians before him. After leaving the army, he entered politics and served a num-
ber of years as Nazim (subdistrict leader) and as a member of the provincial assembly. His 
son, Zain Elahi (sometimes called Zain Khan), became a member of the National Assembly 
and their daughter, Eman Waseem, was an Member of the National Assembly (MNA) from 
Attock District from 2002-2008. One of Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi's younger sons, Chaudhry 
Shafaat Hussain, is married to the daughter of Gul Hammed Khan Rokri, the son of Ghulam 
Haidar Khan Niazi, who is from a prominent Mianwalli District political family (see Figure 
1). A third son, Chaudhry Wajahat Hussain, is married to the daughter of Akhtar Nawaz 
Khan, a former provincial minister from Haripur District (see Figure 1). He was, very sadly, 
assassinated in 2009, and, like many politicians from Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa (KPK) prov-
ince, flirted with various political affiliations, including the Awami National Party. Akhtar 
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Nawaz's brother, Gohar Nawaz Khan, is currently a member of the KPK provincial assem-
bly and belongs to the Qoumi Wattan Party  
Even this small cohort illustrates the extent to which political networking has been 
achieved through marriages. The social network map in Figure 1 shows descent connections 
with directional arrowed lines (indicating downward generational transmission) and marital 
connections with bi-directional arrowed lines (rendered thicker for emphasis). All of the 
named individuals are, or have been, actively involved in electoral politics. We have inten-
tionally not named individuals who have neither held nor run for office. 
In Figure 1, the obvious central node, Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi, is arguably the in-
stigator of the marital network. It is his descendants who have married outside of their 
lineage to hitherto unrelated groups of politically active families in other parts of Pakistan 
that results in a network that exhibits both resilience and robustness. To the right of 
Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi, we see his father (Chaudhry Sardar Khan Warraich) with two 
descent lines emerging connecting both Chaudhry Zahoor and his brother Chaudhry 
Manzoor Elahi. Following the stated preferential marriage expectations, the children of 
these two brothers have married one another. Chaudhry Manzoor Elahi’s son, Chaudhry 
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Figure 1: The significant key marriages that join members of separate political families and 
lineages, as well as being ways in which marriage can be used to consolidate existing political 
families.
Pervez Elahi, married Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s daughter. Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s son, 
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, married Chaudhry Manzoor Elahi’s daughter. These two mar-
riages constitute a straight reproduction of the earlier generation and consolidate both re-
sources and kin identity within a single lineage. There are three other strategic marriages 
that do not conform to the pattern of close, like-for-like marriages, however. We take 
each of these in turn. 
Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s Daughter and Major Tahir Sadiq’s marriage represents 
not only a break from lineage marriage, but also from marriage within caste. Major Tahir 
Sadiq comes from a Khattar family. Khattar’s are a prominent caste in northern Punjab in 
Rawalpindi Division concentrated primarily in Attock District and around Taxila and Wah 
along the Grand Trunk Road. They were influential in the British era and received large 
land grants at various points in India’s history. One of the most notable Khattar politi-
cians was Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan (1882-1942), who expanded his family’s already con-
siderable wealth into significant political power before. Major Tahir Sadiq, is therefore 
part of an extremely influential familial network dating back several generations. We 
have only included his parents and his son and daughter in this graph, but in addition to 
active politicians included here, there is an extensive network of Khattar politicians that 
hold prominent positions of influence at Sub District, District and Provincial levels. This 
single marital union provides the Chaudhrys of Gujrat a strong, personal connection to 
one of the most important political networks in northern Punjab. 
The second strategic marriage that differs from the expected pattern, is between 
Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s second son, Chaudhry Shufaat Hussain and Gul Hameed 
Rokri’s daughter. Gul Hameed Rokri’s family caste is Niazi. The Niazis of Mianwali 
have produced an impressive number of influential politicians (including Imran Khan, 
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Figure 2:  Map of Northern Pakistan showing the locations of the four districts Haripur, Attock, 
Mianwali and Gujrat. Through marriage, the Chaudhrys of Gujrat have created tangible political 
connections that bind each of these districts.
though his political base is considerably broader than the usual lineage based politics). He 
is an important politician who has held a remarkable number elected offices throughout 
his career. The marriage between his daughter and the Gujrati Chaudhrys represents a po-
tentially powerful alliance of otherwise geographically separated networks. Moreover, his 
family connections to prominent politicians from other political parties, provides a num-
ber of useful channels for informal negotiations that might otherwise trigger undue atten-
tion. 
The final strategic exogamous marriage included here is Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s 
third son, Chaudhry Wajahat Hussain and Akhtar Nawaz Khan’s daughter. Akhtar Khan 
Nawaz was sadly assassinated in 2009, but his family have long represented one of the 
powerful blocs in Haripur District that borders KPK and Punjab. In addition to providing 
the Chaudhry family with a direct personal connection to a powerful political family from 
a different region and province, this marriage crosses political party lines. Akhtar Nawaz 
Khan was a member of the Awami National Party. His brother, Gohar Nawaz Khan, is a 
member of the Qaumi Watan Party.	
These three strategic marriages provide critical connections to remote districts of 
Punjab and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. They provide affinal connections to Attock and Mianwal-
li in northwest Punjab and to Haripur in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. They link four biradari: Jats 
(from Gujrat), Khattars (from Attock), Niazis (from Mianwalli) and Tareen (from Hazara)
(see Map, Figure 2).  
Not all marriages are arranged with distant political dynasties, of course. The first 
marriages discussed above joins parallel cousins. Altogether, the Chaudhry's marital net-
works serve to consolidate the dynastic connections through intra- and inter-biradari mar-
riage. However, the importance of these marital connections must not be overestimated. The 
networks are not inviolable and the individuals involved are capable of disagreeing with one 
another. What makes the networks effective, though, is that there are multiple channels of 
communication among the members. In addition to the usual political meetings in which 
they all jointly participate, the networks provide informal opportunities for strategizing and 
coordinating political activities. 
 The same social network is shown in Figure 3 without name labels to make evident 
the pattern for the marriages making up the network shown in Figure 1. The marriages are 
labeled as Unions 1 through 6. Of these, Unions 1, 2 and 3 serve as bridging links joining 
unrelated clusters of political families. Unions 4 and 5 illustrate the repeat endogamous ex-
changes that are typical in Pakistan. These not only serve purposes of cross generational 
replication of lineages, they also reinforce bonds between siblings within a generation. 
Union 6 is not directly relevant for explaining the influence of the Gujrati Chaudhrys, but is 
included to reflect the extent of the political involvement by the members of that family. 
Implications 
These data have two key implications. The first involves questions of legitimacy and narra-
tives that authorize individuals to claim political power. The second is more logistical and 
pragmatic. Such unions provide tangible channels for communication outside reliable lineage 
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networks. The unions created through marriage bind political competitors in ways that facili-
tate communication in a particularly challenging environment.  
Part of the driving force underpinning the particular configurations one finds in Pak-
istani political lineages is an aspiration for legitimacy. Pakistani politics are riddled with sto-
ries of offices or resources taken by force. In the rural areas, the use of force to take either 
brides or land is referred to as kabza. Kabza, however, is by consensus a negative way to 
assert control over others, and so those who engage in these tactics simultaneously develop 
intricate narratives to legitimize their use of force to achieve their goals. Controlling large 
tracts of land in rural areas usually requires a combination of actual force, in the form of loy-
al peasant farmers who are occasionally willing to arm themselves on behalf of their land-
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Figure 3: The same network as in Figure 1, but with individual people’s names removed in or-
der to focus on the significance of the marital unions.
lord, as well as a genealogical ties to the area and any disputed lands (Lyon 2013). Force, by 
itself, is inherently unstable and vulnerable. The same is true for the prizes of party electoral 
politics. One needs a claim that is seen as being legitimate. This is partly achieved through 
the power of oratory, but is greatly enhanced through strong network connections to those 
who have succeeded in politics in the past. Among the individuals included in Figure 1, the 
children of Major Tahir Sadiq draw their legitimacy not only from their father’s illustrious 
lineage (the Khattars) but also from their mother’s side (the Chaudhrys). The Gujrati 
Chaudhrys emerged as a political force more recently, but have been extraordinarily success-
ful under successive regimes, so individuals that can combine recent their national political 
authority with historically established clout clearly need not work hard to develop narratives 
of legitimacy. In Sindh, perhaps the most famous Pakistani politician of the 1960s and 1970s, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was undoubtedly a gifted politician, despite his tragic end, but he un-
doubtedly had added authority and influence because he came from a politically successful 
family. Imran Khan's anecdotes about his father having been present at the 1940 Lahore 
Conference, where the Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah became a full supporter of a 
separate homeland for India's Muslims, are not casual tales. They are assertions of legitima-
cy. 
Narratives of legitimacy that center on lineage are widespread, but should perhaps 
be considered incomplete. Despite a kinship system that emphasizes paternity, marriage of-
fers a concrete way of establishing meaningful social relations that are not dependent on 
shared ancestry. Within this this dynastic political landscape we find mechanisms for inclu-
sion of those who lack desirable pedigree narratives. The families we have examined here, 
for example, illustrate the ways in which a relatively recent politically active family (the 
Chaudhrys of Gujrat) can form alliances with families that have been politically more active 
historically. We do not suggest that the Chaudhrys are not from a prestigious caste (Jats are 
certainly one of the caste considered more noble than many others), but the children of these 
cross caste marriages benefit from a powerful combination of narratives from distinct lin-
eage connections.  Marriage allows connections across families that spread the legitimacy 
beyond those who, otherwise, are exclusively patrilineally connected (in Figure 3 these are 
unions 4, 5 and 6), though, as with every other claim for legitimacy, these claims do not go 
unchallenged by rivals. 
In addition to establishing legitimacy, complex marital networks bind together com-
petitive participants in the political process by offering opportunities for negotiation of con-
flict. Marriage strategies exhibit both resilience and robustness. Robustness comes from 
preferential marriage patterns in which like marry like, including party affiliation. Within 
Pakistani marriage systems, resilience is ensured through a few exogamous marriages, both 
from lineage and party,that bridge party political boundaries. Intra lineage marriages, espe-
cially those between the children of siblings, reinforce political alliances that are in fact al-
ready supposed to be very strong. When siblings compete overtly with one another, the neg-
ative reputation that can spread can jeopardize anyone closely associated with any of the 
siblings. So cousin marriages do little to extend networks and therefore provide few, if any, new 
allies. Inter lineage marriages, on the other hand, offer a less coherent, but more flexible array of 
allies who can support one another in the event of turbulence or unexpected political turns. In the 
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normal operations of Pakistani politics, resilience in the face of shocks is not simply a convenience, 
but is almost certainly a necessity to ensure long term political survival. While this may under-
mine coherent party ideologies or practices, arguably it provides greater flexibility for crisis 
management. We argue that Pakistan is not a failed state, but is a state that must frequently 
deal with crisis, so using marriages to maximize both the group’s and the individual's capaci-
ty to adapt to changing political and economic circumstances is necessary for survival. 
Again the Chaudhry family provide a remarkable lesson in Pakistani political sur-
vival. The family has survived the assassination of its founder, and ongoing factionalism 
within the Pakistan Muslim League between the Chaudhry Shujaat ‘Wing’ and the Nawaz 
Sharif ‘Wing’. Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was a prominent member of different govern-
ments and found himself on the ‘losing’ side on more than one occasion, but he and his fam-
ily, have sustainably recovered from shocks that have destroyed other, less successful, polit-
ical families. The proof is perhaps to be found in the success of the next generation. While 
the generation of Chaudhry Shujaat and Pervez Elahi are arguably retired or nearing retire-
ment, their children have proven they can win elections and retain political office.  
Conclusion 
In Levi-Strauss’ useful distinction between elementary and complex kinship systems, there 
are two opposing strategies for determining marriage partners. In the complex system, the 
choice is determined by a set of negative rules (who one must not marry). In the elementary 
system, the choice is made through positive rules (who one must marry). In Pakistan, there 
are ‘soft’ rules for who one must or must not marry. In both village level marriages, as in 
prominent party political family marriages, what we find is that all of these rules are subject 
to contingent political expediency. The reproduction of preferential marriage ‘rules’ is un-
derpinned by a pragmatic assessment of what ensures household survival best. Historically, 
that has frequently led to close cousin marriage, in which resources can be confined with 
finite group boundaries, however, that results in overly ‘closed’ networks that lack sufficient 
links to develop useful cooperation across lineages. As Turner found among the Ndembu 
(1957), despite clear and agreed rules that supposedly regulate marriage in societies, indi-
viduals can and often do make decisions that are in the best interest of the household even if 
the ‘rules’ might suggest a different set of decisions. The distinction of elementary and com-
plex is consequently a useful typology, but perhaps should not be applied to real ethnograph-
ic situations too rigidly. 
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____________________________
1 The English term, family, is problematic. Unfortunately, the Urdu and Punjabi equivalents are 
equally inadequate for describing the grouping with which we are concerned, namely a group of 
households who self-identify as related and who exhibit the capacity for cooperation on important 
issues. They are also one another's most serious political and economic rivals. Most members of 
these households trace their ancestry back to a common ancestor who lived around the late 18th 
century.
	Though Zahid focussed mainly on members of elected institutions, the data were drawn from sub 2
district, provincial and national levels, so they provide a useful measure of political influence in 
general.
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